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Abstract 
 
 
This paper considers whether and how ‘vitalism’ might be considered relevant as a 
concept today; whether its relevance should be expressed in terms of disciplinary 
demarcations between the life sciences and the natural sciences; and whether there is a 
fundamental incompatibility between a 'vitalism of process' and a 'vitalism as pathos' 
(Osborne, 2016). I argue that the relevance of vitalism as an epistemological and 
ontological problem concerning the categorical distinction between living and non-
living beings must be contextualised historically, and referred exclusively to the 
epistemic horizon defined by classical physics. In contrast to this, drawing on the 
philosophies of Canguilhem, Whitehead, and Atlan, I propose an appreciation of the 
contemporary relevance of vitalism premised on the pathic and indeterminate character 
of nature as a whole. From this perspective vitalism expresses a politically significant 
ethos concerning the relationship between life, knowledge, problems and their solutions. 
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The status of life in nature … is the modern problem of philosophy and of 
science. (Whitehead, 1968: 148) 
 
 
Generic definitions of vitalism refer it to the notion that ‘living organisms are 
fundamentally different from non-living entities because they contain some non-
physical element or are governed by different principles than are inanimate things’ 
(Bechtel and Richardson, 1998).1 Long discredited as a concept on account of its 
spiritualist and teleological connotations, until recently vitalism has been invoked 
derogatively to disqualify discursive opponents more than it has been genuinely debated 
as to its possible merits.  This situation has changed in the last decade or so, with a 
conspicuous proliferation of publications on the subject in the humanities and social 
sciences.  A new sense of urgency traverses recent engagements with this very old 
theme. Even historians no longer seem to approach it from the safety of retrospective 
epistemological distance, and now dare to take seriously ‘the idea of vitalism as a 
“meta-theoretical commitment”’ (Normandin and Wolfe, 2013: 11). Vitalism, in other 
words, appears to matter again; not as a rhetorical straw man to be denounced by 
smugly superior forms of thought, nor as a historical datum to be described and 
accounted for from a position of detached neutrality, but as something one might want 
to associate with, and be associated with, despite the theoretical and professional risks 
involved. 
 
In the anglophone context, this development can be traced to two distinct albeit not 
unrelated genealogies, each linked to the provocation of a French philosopher who 
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characterized his thought as ‘vitalist’ while fully cognizant of the hostility surrounding 
the term and of its compromising connotations.2  One of these is Georges Canguilhem, 
philosopher of medicine and biology, whose reception as a thinker in his own right – 
rather than as a precursor of Michel Foucault – began in the 1990s, following the 
appearance of a new anthology (A Vital Rationalist, 1994) and a reprinting of his main 
work (The Normal and the Pathological, 1991) by Zone Books.  As others have noted, 
these works initially found their most fertile audience among social scientists, at a time 
when the conceptual and ethical challenges associated with rapidly developing 
biotechnologies were becoming central concerns for medical anthropologists and 
sociologists alike (Geroulanos, 2009).  On the whole, Canguilhem tended to be read in 
this context as a historical epistemologist whose work was interesting despite, rather 
than because of, his vitalist leanings, which were sometimes addressed as a point of 
criticism.3  Already then, however, there were readers for whom Canguilhem’s 
approach to vitalism constituted the focus of interest in his work, particularly for the 
way in which it recast the problem of vitalism into an ethics of  ‘problematology’ 
(Osborne, 2003).4 More recently, Canguilhem’s vitalism has become an object of 
analysis among historians and philosophers of the life sciences; and we can speculate 
that a resurgence of historiographical research on various forms of vitalism in medicine 
and biology has similarly been encouraged by his example.5   
 
Across the anglophone humanities and social sciences more generally, however, the 
contemporary buzz around vitalism owes probably more to the reception of Deleuze in 
the context of the multi-stranded project of a ‘new materialism’ and, more broadly, of a 
move towards processual and ‘non-representational’ approaches to theory and research.6  
If, in its classical versions, vitalism expresses a concern with explaining the specificity 
 	
	 4	
of biological life, in this other context vitalism as a concept is addressed to reality as a 
whole, eliding the categorical difference between animate and inanimate, living and 
non-living entities. An implicit enthusiasm for the ‘vital’ as a signifier of contingency, 
potentiality, and the possibility of change is apparent in much writing associated with 
this intellectual movement. There is now explicit talk of a ‘vitalist turn’, one that would 
supersede the ‘discursive’ while encompassing the ‘affective’ and the ‘ontological’ 
(turns) (e.g. Gandy and Jasper, 2017; Susen, 2015; Mitchell, 2013) – the latest in a 
series of turns to claim the theoretical cutting edge in disciplines ranging from 
geography to sociology, to art and literary criticism.   
 
These recent developments in the discursive landscape of vitalism have transformed the 
connotations of the term, not in the sense of supplanting the traditional or classical 
connotations altogether, but rather of adding significantly new and different semantic 
strata to those already sedimented historically.  In this process, the perception of the 
fallacies and risks involved in taking ‘vitalism’ seriously has also been transformed, 
prompting new efforts to articulate significant contrasts in order to specify what 
versions of vitalism (if any) might justify a commitment to the concept in the twenty-
first century.  Recent examples of demarcatory efforts of this kind include the 
distinctions between theoretical versus experimental vitalism (Mitchell 2013); 
substantive versus heuristic (or functional), versus existential vitalism (Wolfe and 
Wong, 2015; Wolfe, 2011; Wolfe, 2015); and between a vitalism of process versus a 
vitalism as pathos (Osborne, 2016).  Such distinctions are evaluative and normative as 
well as descriptive; they are designed not only to bring order to a situation of semantic 
multiplicity in the spirit of a typology, but also implicitly or explicitly to ‘discipline’ 
such multiplicity by taming, correcting, or containing a range of perceived excesses.  So 
 	
	 5	
for example, in their introduction to the edited volume Vitalism and the Scientific 
Image, Normandin and Wolfe explicitly distance their editorial strategy – which they 
describe as focused on vitalism in ‘the context of philosophical, natural-historical and 
biomedical reflections on the nature of living beings’ – from vitalism understood as 
designating ‘political (or “biopolitical”) positions’ (2013: 3). While multiple rationales 
could justify an editorial focus on the life sciences and cognate disciplines, the wording 
of the justification as seen here reproduces a familiar opposition between ‘science’ (or 
‘nature’) and ‘politics’, with its baggage of normative implications. Elsewhere, as we 
shall see in more detail below, Thomas Osborne (2016) proposes that vitalism remains a 
relevant concept if it is confined to the biological and medical domains, rejecting its 
appropriations for wider social-theoretical purposes.  
 
My own contribution to this discussion is motivated by a concern that some of the 
demarcations currently being proposed, while intended to clarify, are at risk of 
introducing further confusion in debates around vitalism generally; and of obscuring 
what may be truly interesting and relevant now, more than ever, about a commitment to 
vitalism. In particular, I am concerned about the way in which this contemporary 
literature seeks to reaffirm vitalism as an epistemological and ontological problem 
regarding the distinction between the living and the non-living. In contrast to this I will 
argue that the problematic of vitalism now, and indeed ultimately for Canguilhem, no 
longer concerns this question.  The ‘problem of life’ – as we glean it from the 
configuration of the sciences today, but also, and no less, from the problems that 
characterize the experience of life in contemporary times – renders vitalism as an 
ethical and political problem, concerning the quality of our engagement with problems 
and with their solutions.  
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The ‘disciplining’ of vitalism, as I have hinted above, bears a more or less explicit 
relation to disciplinarity. This is clearest in Thomas Osborne’s recent contribution to the 
journal Biosemiotics, which articulates his critical response to the ascendancy of a 
‘vitalism of generalized becoming and process’, ascribed to the reception of Bergson 
and Whitehead ‘via the more direct influence of Deleuze’ (2016: 186).  The most salient 
and objectionable feature of this vitalism of generalized becoming, in Osborne’s 
reading, is its ‘analogical’ generalization of vitality to matter as a whole, and thus the 
elision between life in a biological sense and nature being conceived as alive ‘in toto 
with no particular privilege for the living being’ (2016: 193). This vitalism is 
‘affirmative’ and ‘celebratory’ in that it associates the processual nature of reality with 
positive values of creativity, dynamism, generativity. What is lost in this generalization, 
Osborne argues, is the pathic dimension of life such as we observe it in (and experience 
it as) living organisms. A vitalism premised on the recognition of this pathic dimension 
would characterize life not simply as affirmatively ‘vital’ but as permanently engaged in 
a relationship with the possibility of its negation – death, disease, sub-normativity, 
error. Juxtaposing Canguilhem to Deleuze but especially Whitehead, Osborne thus 
argues that any contemporary renewal of vitalism ‘would have to base itself on the 
normativity of the living organism’ and would also ‘need to accommodate … the pathic 
aspects of life … everything that makes us, as living beings, potentially weak, without 
power, at a loss’; to do otherwise would be ‘to miss much of the originality – and 
interest – of the vitalist perspective itself’ (2016: 185). Osborne insists, accordingly, that 
vitalism as pathos must be understood as ‘disciplinary’, that is, as specifically relevant 
to biology and the life sciences rather than as a concept of more general philosophical, 
sociological, or political import.   
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Osborne’s text makes a timely and significant contribution by staging the relationship 
between vitalism and the disciplinary domains of biology and the life sciences as a 
question. This contrasts with most other writing, where a commitment to disciplinarity 
exists implicitly and by default (often alongside nominal tributes to the contrary) simply 
as an effect of thinking and writing within the canons of scholarly convention and 
specialization.  The argument I develop in the following pages will focus on this 
question of disciplinarity. The argument acknowledges the importance of Osborne’s 
contribution in this sense, and is thoroughly in agreement with his characterization of 
vitalism as pathos, which is indeed congruent with Canguilhem’s ‘problematological’ 
approach. I will argue, however, that this characterization does not imply or require that 
the relevance of vitalism be confined to the biological domain. Developing a reading of 
Canguilhem I presented in an earlier piece (see Greco, 2005), I will propose that 
vitalism in the history of the life sciences has value not as a representation of 
(biological) ‘life’ but as its valid representative, the symptom or indicator of an excess 
of life with respect to the scope of positive knowledge.  This characterization subverts 
the contemporary relevance of distinctions such as the one between heuristic and 
substantival vitalism, in so far as these precisely confine vitalism to the function of a 
(more or less valid, more or less provisional) representation of living beings as objects 
of scientific knowledge. In a similar way, the juxtaposition of a vitalism of process to 
vitalism as pathos appears misleading, in so far as each indexes life or vitality to a type 
of entity or object – ‘matter’ as a whole on the one hand, biological ‘organisms’ on the 
other. I will argue that to endorse vitalism as a representation and to limit the pertinence 
of vitalism to the biological domain reproduces what Canguilhem characterised as a 
‘philosophically inexcusable mistake’ (1998: 95). This limitation is not innocent or 
 	
	 8	
harmless; by constituting vitalism as a false problem, it actively distracts from the ways 
in which the problematic of vitalism remains itself alive and relevant today. 
 
(The problem of) life is not what it used to be: disambiguating ‘science’  
 
As a first step in understanding the evolution of vitalism as a problematic, let me 
distinguish between two different frames of reference that stem from the history of 
scientific thought. This appears necessary because the value or tenability of vitalist 
propositions is typically discussed in relation to implicit epistemological norms 
associated with scientific knowledge, but often with scant if any attention to normative 
differences internal to ‘science’, such that the latter becomes an ambiguous referent and 
the source of much potential confusion. The following exposition is not intended to 
provide any detailed account of what Bachelard (1986) would have called  ‘regional 
rationalisms’ at different points in their history, but rather to sketch, in the broadest 
terms, the outline of a contrast that is specifically relevant to the problem of vitalism.  
Borrowing terms from Prigogine and Stengers (1984) for convenience, I will refer to the 
first frame of reference as that of  ‘classical mechanics’, or Newtonian science; and to 
the second frame of reference as that of the ‘science of complexity’, ushered by the 
second law of thermodynamics. As Prigogine and Stengers briefly discuss in their book, 
even the animistic vitalism of eighteenth-century chemist Georg Ernst Stahl – currently 
the most discredited version of the concept – had a raison d’être in the conceptual 
horizon defined by classical science. In that context, it constituted a valid protest against 
the ‘abstract imperialism of the Newtonians’ that would reduce ‘living processes to 
peaceful mechanisms and the quiet unfolding of universal laws’ (1984: 83). Stahl 
posited a soul (or anima) as the vital principle enabling ‘life’, which he understood as 
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resistance to the decay and decomposition that would otherwise follow from the 
(supposedly) universal laws of matter.  Like other forms of spiritualist vitalism, Stahl’s 
constitutes a ‘philosophically inexcusable mistake’ in so far as it represents the living as 
an exception to the order of nature – a mistake rooted in the assumption that the order of 
nature as a whole could be adequately described by classical physics (Canguilhem 1998 
[1965]): 95). Nevertheless, Stahl’s was more than just an error: it was a justifiable error, 
one that was logically consistent with the limitations of Newtonian science and that 
therefore functioned, symptomatically, as an indicator of those limitations. In Prigogine 
and Stengers’ words (1984: 84), ‘Stahl’s vitalism is relevant as long as the laws of 
physics are identified with evolution toward decay and disorganization’, as they indeed 
were (and are) in classical mechanics.   
 
The error involved in animistic forms of vitalism like Stahl’s appears rather less 
justifiable when considered in the context of the second, and more recent, scientific 
frame of reference. In the horizon defined by the science of complexity, processes 
involving randomness and irreversibility are no longer considered exceptions and it is 
possible to observe conditions under which matter becomes self-organizing – or, in 
Stahlian terms, immanently capable of resisting decay and decomposition. The new 
science thus includes the possibility of accounting for the evolution of living beings as 
self-organizing phenomena that are of a particularly high order of complexity, but not 
fundamentally discontinuous, or different in principle, from other complex phenomena 
occurring at a variety of possible levels of description. From within this horizon it is not 
only unnecessary but logically inconsistent to posit a supplementary transcendental 
force or principle (like the soul) at the origin of biological self-organization or ‘life’.  
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The relevance of distinguishing between what I have characterised as two frames of 
reference is not limited to the evaluation of animistic versions of vitalism. Indeed, it is 
important to stress that Stahlian animism was by no means typical of eighteenth-century 
vitalism as a whole. Already in 1952, before recent historical studies fleshed out this 
proposition more systematically, Canguilhem insisted that it was  
 
time to be done with the accusation of metaphysics (hence of fantasy, if not 
worse) that still pursues the vitalist biologists of the eighteenth century. In fact … 
vitalism rejected two metaphysical interpretations of the causes of organic 
phenomena: animism and mechanism. All the eighteenth century vitalists were 
Newtonians [as distinct from Cartesians], men who resisted hypotheses about the 
essences of phenomena and thought they had only to describe and coordinate 
effects as they perceived them, directly and without bias. (2008: 122)7 
 
As others have argued, this point warrants a different evaluation of, for example, the 
materialist vitalism of Diderot, or the medical vitalism of the Montpellier School. 
Diderot, in explicit contrast to animism and spiritualist dualism, posited ‘sensitivity as a 
property common to all matter or as a result of the organization of matter’ for the 
explanation of life (Diderot 1976: 159). He expected, in other words, that the 
explanation of life would eventually require scientists to revise the assumptions they 
made about the nature of matter more generally. As for Montpellier vitalism, recent 
studies have plausibly interpreted the views of vitalist physicians like Paul-Joseph 
Barthez and Théophile de Bordeu as a form of proto-emergentism, anticipating 
developments that would become theoretically and experimentally established only 
much later (Kaitaro 2008; Wolfe and Terada 2008).8  In the discourse of the 
 	
	 11	
montpelliérains, Wolfe and Terada argue, the notion of an immanent  ‘vital principle’ 
can be read – and was indeed conceived at the time – as having the function of a 
placeholder (nom d’attente), marking the limitations of classical mechanism and the 
correlated expectation (attente) that a natural science of organized living matter could 
and would develop in the future. In terms of our two frames of reference, these vitalists 
were therefore ‘Newtonians’ – but only in the sense that they were empiricists, invested 
in seeking to resolve the problem of life by developing natural science itself, in contrast 
to those who sought a transcendental solution to the limitations of classical mechanism. 
Their versions of vitalism cannot be regarded as a ‘philosophically inexcusable mistake’ 
in the same sense as Stahlian animism, since in principle they do not address life as an 
exception to the order of nature. This point has an obvious historiographical relevance, 
by correcting the reductive caricaturization of all forms of vitalism as forms of 
spiritualist transcendentalism. Some scholars suggest that the version of vitalism 
exemplified by the Montpellier School offers the grounds for a rehabilitation of the 
concept, or for the proposition that vitalism is ‘not necessarily dead’ (Kaitaro 2008: 
591). We will come shortly to consider whether the contemporary relevance of vitalism 
can indeed be justified in these terms, or whether something quite different is required.  
 
So far I have presented – albeit very schematically – the distinction between two frames 
of reference that stem from the history of Western scientific thought.  From this 
preliminary discussion we can begin to draw some basic conclusions concerning the 
relationship between vitalism and the notion that ‘living organisms are fundamentally 
different from non-living entities’ (Bechtel and Richardson, 1998). How should we 
understand this relationship, in light of the transformation of fundamental assumptions 
that is implicit in the passage from the first to the second of our frames of reference? 
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Life as exception, life as norm: disciplinarity and the question of ‘imperialism’ 
 
The conviction of a ‘fundamental difference’ between living and non-living beings 
constitutes the problematic of vitalism in so far as vitalist thought developed and 
expressed itself in the history of modern biology, against an epistemological horizon 
already shaped by the assumptions of classical physics. An articulation of the difference 
as irreducible is what allowed the physicians and chemists of the eighteenth century to 
transgress that normative horizon, to object to the universality of the laws of classical 
mechanics, and thereby to allow physiology to develop as an autonomous discipline. 
However, from today’s perspective, the limitations of Newtonian science do not only 
concern biology as the science of living organisms. Diderot anticipated this when his 
materialist solution to the problem of life involved, not positing life as an exception to 
the norm of classical materialism, but on the contrary revising materialism so as to 
accommodate the logical possibility of life: even ‘stone must feel’, however hard the 
proposition may be to swallow (1966: 149).  Since Diderot’s day, our appreciation of 
the exceptionality or otherwise of phenomena characterized by what he called 
‘sensitivity’ – by instability, temporality, growth and development – has undergone a 
fundamental reversal. If the laws of classical physics were once assumed as a universal 
baseline against which living phenomena appeared to be an exception, now it is these 
very laws that appear narrowly conditional to very specific, and in this sense 
‘exceptional’, situations. To cite Prigogine and Stengers one more time: 
 
The models considered by classical physics seem to us to occur only in limiting 
situations such as we can create artificially by putting matter into a box and then 
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waiting until it reaches equilibrium. The artificial may be deterministic and 
reversible. The natural contains essential elements of randomness and 
irreversibility. This leads to a new view of matter in which matter is no longer the 
passive substance described in the mechanistic world view but is associated with 
spontaneous activity.  (1984: 9) 
 
Canguilhem’s claim – baffling, to some contemporary interpreters – that ‘classical 
vitalism sins, paradoxically, only in its excessive modesty, in its reluctance to 
universalize its conception of experience’ (2008: 70) should be understood in the 
context of this general reversal in perspective that occurred in the passage from the 
first to the second of our frames of reference. In relinquishing assumptions about the 
fundamentally stable, determinable, and observable character of their subject matter, 
the physical sciences have come increasingly to resemble biology – contradicting a 
classical expectation that progress would involve movement in the opposite 
direction. The ‘imperialism’ or generalisation of a vitalist conception of experience 
refers to this fundamental reversal, which occurred autonomously – if unexpectedly – 
in the physical sciences themselves as they pursued their own problems, remaining 
‘faithful to their underlying intention … to determine the laws between objects’ 
(2008:70). On this basis, it is mistaken to imagine the imperialism of a vitalist 
conception of experience as implying that the biological sciences should hold ‘the 
entire field’, or involve forms of ‘competition [between the biological and physical 
sciences] over the same disciplinary territory’ (Osborne 2016: 192). An analysis 
framed in terms of disciplinary distinctions is really quite misleading in this context: 
the relevant distinction is not between disciplines, but between two underlying 
frames of reference (or sets of fundamental assumptions) that cut across them.  
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For the same reason, it is mistaken to read Canguilhem’s claim that the domain of 
biology cannot constitute an imperium in imperio through the lens of an 
unreconstructed scientific materialism, to mean, without further qualification, that 
‘the laws of the physical world apply to all living beings, humans included, without 
exception’ (Wolfe and Wong 2013: 73). The very idea that nature (and the physical 
world) should consist of a single homogenous system, with the same laws applying 
evenly and consistently throughout all objects, no matter their differences, is 
Newtonian; the perspectival shift to a vitalist conception of experience implies a 
pluralist universe, one that allows for the emergence of singular structures with 
normativities of their own, tied to local and specific conditions.  Canguilhem really 
could not be clearer on these points. ‘This interpretation’, he writes,  
 
does not take anything away from a physics as determinist as it wants to be and 
can be – it does not take away from physics any of its objects. But it includes the 
physical interpretation within another, which is vaster and more comprehensive, 
since the meaning of physics is justified within it and the activity of the physicist 
fully secured. (2008: 71). 
 
And here the resonance between Canguilhem and Whitehead’s process philosophy, 
pace Osborne, is equally remarkable: 
 
An occasion of experience which includes a human mentality [and the activity of 
the physicist!] is an extreme instance, at one end of the scale, of those happenings 
which constitute nature. But any doctrine which refuses to place human 
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experience outside nature, must find in descriptions of human experience factors 
which also enter into the descriptions of less specialized natural occurrences. If 
there be no such factors, then the doctrine of human experience as a fact within 
nature is mere bluff, founded upon vague phrases whose sole merit is a 
comforting familiarity. We should either admit dualism, at least as a provisional 
doctrine, or we should point out the identical elements connecting human 
experience with physical science. (Whitehead 1935: 237) 
 
Before moving to unfold this passage in more detail, let us briefly return to the 
question of the difference between living and non-living beings, and to how the 
character of that difference should now be conceived. One implication of the 
discussion so far is that biological phenomena certainly retain specificity as a 
particular type or class of self-organizing being. At the same time, however, the 
generic concept of ‘life’ understood as a being’s capacity to be active, to be sensitive, 
and to grow no longer applies exclusively to biological beings but has rather become 
relevant beyond biology, across nature.  This fundamental conceptual shift might 
also be expressed in a diametrically opposite way. To paraphrase Jean Rostand, we 
might say that in the context of our second frame of reference it has become possible 
‘to completely explain life without life’ (Rostand 1939: 155, cited in Canguilhem 
2008: 69). Henri Atlan, a biophysicist and information theorist, echoes this point 
when he cites Albert Szent-Györgyi to claim that ‘life does not exist as such, at least 
not as an object of scientific investigation’ (2011 [1999]: 376). In the context of our 
second frame of reference, in other words, vitalism and the concept of life have 
become redundant and irrelevant for the purpose of scientific description.9  
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Process, life, pathos 
 
This double or reversible proposition – one whereby the whole of nature (and 
therefore none of it specifically) is ‘alive’ – corresponds to what Osborne identifies 
as the fundamental flaw of processual vitalism: ‘[p]recisely in stressing the ubiquity 
of processual becoming there is a tendency to collapse everything into itself, into 
generalized process, thus perhaps losing anything much to do with what is in fact, so 
to speak, originally ‘original’ to life’ (2016: 186). Yet it is not by insisting on a 
demarcation arbitrarily set along disciplinary lines that we may come any closer to 
understanding this ‘originality’, or what is fundamentally at stake in it. The concept 
of pathos, indexing ‘life’ to polarized and dynamic existence, does indeed come 
closer but – as Osborne  (2016: 193) himself briefly acknowledges in relation to 
Whitehead – these features are if anything core to a processual understanding of 
nature, and by no means exclusive to the biological domain. To paraphrase 
Whitehead, who wrote that ‘life refuses to be embalmed alive’ (1978: 339), we might 
say that the concept of life refuses to be embalmed in biology, or indeed in the 
reference to any particular (type of) object.  
 
It is important to stress that denying any ‘fundamental difference’ between living and 
non-living beings does not mean that all difference is denied. The ‘happenings which 
constitute nature’, to use words from the quotation above, occur on a scale and admit 
of gradations along a continuum.  This is no place to offer even a brief summary of 
Whitehead’s processual cosmology, so let it suffice to say that in Modes of Thought 
he specifies a hierarchy of six types of occurrences in nature, ranging from ‘human 
existence’ to ‘happenings on an infinitesimal scale’, albeit also cautioning that the 
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list had ‘purposely been made roughly, without any scientific pretension’ because 
‘[s]uch classification hides the truth that the different modes of natural existence 
shade off into each other’ (1968: 157). Four of the six levels broadly correspond to 
phenomena that constitute objects of the life sciences, and Whitehead is happy to 
refer to them conventionally using terms like ‘animal life’, ‘vegetable life’, ‘living 
cell’, and so on. But the technical term he uses for such occurrences across the six 
levels – to discuss their comparative modes of functioning and organization, 
including their relative degree of stabilization and specialization in relation to their 
environments – is societies. And his discussion of the concept of life makes it clear 
that ‘the nature of life is not to be sought by its identification with some society of 
occasions’ (1978: 107). Life ‘is the name for originality, and not tradition’: therefore, 
since structured societies are identifiable as such by virtue of their conformity to 
their own past (that is, by virtue of their tradition), ‘life cannot be a defining 
characteristic’ of them (1978: 104). In a sense, the concept of life is needed to 
characterize precisely the opposite: not what a certain type of being is but what it is 
not (yet). Specifically, it refers to the ‘origination of conceptual novelty’ in the 
passage from one to the other, and thus to a being’s capacity to become different 
(1978: 102).10 This capacity, while relevant to nature as a whole, is not equally 
distributed across nature, or even across the internal structure of specific societies.  
Whitehead uses the term ‘inorganic’ to refer to structured societies where this mode 
of becoming is relatively ‘unimportant’ and cannot therefore be observed.  
 
In sum, Whitehead’s philosophy certainly admits a distinction between societies that 
have greater or lesser degrees of ‘life’, and even between ‘organic’ and ‘inorganic’ 
societies based on how important life is as a factor in their becoming; but it forbids 
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us from confining the relevance of the concept of life to any particular type or 
category of being (or society). This is because the concept of life applies, and 
logically needs to apply, to even the most basic category posited in his philosophy, 
‘the really real things which in their collective unity compose the evolving universe’ 
(1968: 151), which Whitehead called actual entities, actual occasions, or occasions 
of experience. We will not dwell on his characterization of life at this level of 
description, which would require a more detailed exposition of his technical concepts 
than we have room for here. Far more important, for our immediate purposes, is to 
remind ourselves of what Whitehead’s whole philosophical construction, and the 
whole insistence on the primacy of process over substance, was set up to achieve. Its 
aim, to again invoke the quotation above, is to offer a self-consistent account of 
nature that includes human experience – and human mentality – as part of nature, 
rather as a transcendent factor outside of it. And this involves pointing out ‘the 
identical elements connecting human experience with physical science’ (1935: 237). 
Its aim, in other words, is to conceive nature so that the qualitative vividness of 
experience – including human experience, in all its positive and negative vicissitudes 
– appears intrinsic to it, arising out of its most basic elements, rather than sequestered 
away from the world into the mind of a subject. This is in direct and explicit contrast 
to the image of an indifferent, ‘silent world’ yielded by the development of scientific 
materialism in the seventeenth century, an image from which all meaning and value 
had been expunged. ‘[A] dead nature’, writes Whitehead, ‘aims at nothing. It is the 
essence of life that it exists for its own sake, as the intrinsic reaping of value’ (1968: 
135). In other words: the possibility of articulating pathos, the experience of value, 
as a full-fledged factor in and of the world is the entire point of a ‘vitalism of 
process’.  
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It is thus both inaccurate and unfortunate to interpret processualism per se in the 
spirit of a ‘flattening out’ of meaningful, pathic differences, such as those that obtain 
between living and non-living beings, between humans and non-humans, or between 
other categories as they become relevant in different contexts and situations. This 
type of flattening gesture is indeed evident in certain appropriations of Whitehead or 
other sources of ‘process thought’, notably within non-representational theory, actor-
network theory, or affect theory. In each of these cases the gesture initially has a 
strategic purpose – often targeting specific sets of dominant assumptions – and in 
each case the ‘vitality’ of the gesture itself appears to be spent as soon as it is 
consolidated into a fixed, and inevitably partial, theoretical form.11 
 
Whence ‘vitalism’? 
 
I have argued against a ‘disciplinary’ interpretation of the contemporary relevance of 
vitalism. If vitalism can remain interesting as a form of commitment today, it is 
precisely to the extent that it can be reconciled with the notion that there is no 
‘fundamental difference’ between living and non-living beings. This is entirely 
congruent with Canguilhem’s position. Indeed, his own philosophical reflections on 
vitalism take the refutation of vitalism on the part of biologists as a given and as a point 
of departure: what must be accounted for, philosophically, is the tenacity and vitality of 
vitalism as a biological ‘illusion’ (2008: 60), not the originality of biological 
phenomena as such. I have also argued that the universalization of a vitalist conception 
of experience, as advocated by Canguilhem and implicit in Whitehead, does not imply 
the ascription of a generalized, uniformly distributed quality of aliveness or vitality 
across nature, or to matter as a whole. Indeed, the conceptual shift involved is of a 
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different order altogether, such that ‘vitalism’ no longer concerns how to describe and 
explain what is alive versus what is not. 
 
Canguilhem famously described vitalism as ‘an imperative rather than a method and 
more of an ethical system, perhaps, than a theory’ (1994: 288).12 He paraphrases 
Emanuel Rádl to elaborate on what a vitalist ethos entails, in a passage that again 
resonates strongly with Whitehead’s project:  
 
Man, [Rádl] says, can consider nature in two ways. Either he feels himself a child 
of nature and experiences a sentiment of belonging and subordination to it; he 
sees himself in nature and nature in himself. Or else, he holds himself in front of 
nature as before a foreign, indefinable object. A scientist who experiences a filial 
sentiment, a sentiment of sympathy toward nature, does not consider natural 
phenomena to be strange and foreign – he finds life, soul, and meaning in them, 
completely naturally. Such a man is fundamentally a vitalist. (2008: 63-64) 
The significant difference here in terms of defining what vitalism is about is not a 
difference ‘out there’, between living and non-living beings, between the objects of 
biology or physics. The difference concerns rather the quality of relation that man 
establishes with nature, where one possible version of that relation involves ‘filial 
sentiment’ and subordination, while the other consists in affirming a separation, positing 
the relationship in terms of a subject standing before an alien object to be known. 
Mechanism renders man ‘a living being separated from life by science and attempting to 
rejoin life through science’ (2008: 62). By contrast, vitalism comprehends ‘science itself 
… within the activity of the living’ (2008: 70); to adapt a phrase from Whitehead, it 
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regards science as part of ‘the cumulation of the universe and not a stage-play about it’ 
(1978: 237).  
Vitalism as ethos, then, is characterized first of all by an attitude that acknowledges that 
there is a mutually constitutive relationship between life and knowledge. For a vitalist, 
the quality of that relationship at any one time constitutes an open problem, an object of 
permanent reflection, one that by definition cannot defer to ‘science’ the expectation of 
a solution. In a scientist, a vitalist ethos tempers the impulse to pay attention to 
problems, to consider them relevant, only to the extent that they can be appropriated 
into the idiom of scientific description; it institutes the principle of a limit or a boundary 
to the relevance of such descriptions, and the importance of a dialogue between science 
and a relevant beyond. The originality of life that vitalism affirms must similarly be 
interpreted in the spirit of a ‘filial’ relationship of subordination. In this sense, 
originality means that life (as the totality of nature alive) has logical and genealogical 
priority over knowledge, as origin and source; knowledge is a product, a subset, a child 
of nature alive, although of course, once it has come into being, it is also a factor in the 
becoming of nature. This characterization certainly admits of more specific inflections 
in relation to distinct branches of knowledge; in medicine, for example, it signals the 
(genea)logical priority of the pathological (the experience of sickness) over the 
scientific definition of the normal: physiology ‘is the collection of solutions to problems 
posed by sick men through their illnesses’ (Canguilhem 1989: 100). But stressing the 
importance of local specificities and differences should not obscure the fact that that 
there is a general relevance to vitalism as ethos in terms of the acknowledgment that 
knowledge abstracts from life, and as such it is only ever partial, incomplete, 
provisional on a variety of temporal scales, not least because the universe evolves and 
changes, forever ahead of our descriptions. Trust and confidence in life here point to the 
 	
	 22	
cultivation – alongside knowledge and not against it, as we shall see – of a certain 
childlike naivety in our encounters with the world, an ability to follow the invitation of 
such encounters without knowing where they might lead, and to let the encounter make 
a difference to our assumptions. Vitalist doctrines in the history of biology can be read, 
and respected, in this sense: not as scientifically valid representations of ‘life’ but as 
representatives, markers of a scientist’s encounter with ‘life’ as a question and as a 
relevant beyond.  
 
Coming full circle: vitalism as wisdom 
 
Vitalism understood as an ethos and mindset, as I have presented it here, and which I 
propose corresponds to Canguilhem’s version of a vitalist commitment, may now 
appear very distant from any concern with differentiating living from non-living beings. 
It appears distant, in fact, from any concern with the specific nature or character of 
‘living’ phenomena as objects of scientific description. As such, this characterization 
may seem so counter-intuitive as to make us wonder whether using the term ‘vitalism’ 
is warranted, other than in the spirit of a provocation. This is a good question, and of 
course neither Canguilhem nor Deleuze – and certainly not Whitehead – subscribed to  
‘vitalism’ in any straightforward, conventional, or unprovocative sense. And yet, this 
distance from the problem of ‘life’ as conventionally understood is only a superficial 
impression, for a vitalist ethos indeed emerges from acknowledging the implications of 
contemporary scientific descriptions of biological phenomena, even when these 
descriptions deny any ‘fundamental difference’ between living and non-living beings. 
This is best explained with reference to what Henri Atlan calls ‘philosophy in the shape 
of wisdom’ (2011 [1991]: 384). Before dwelling on the details of his proposition, and to 
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avoid possible misunderstanding, it is worth recalling that Atlan has written extensively 
about his antagonism towards vitalism, conventionally understood as per Bechtel and 
Richardson’s definition. It is not surprising therefore that he should avoid using the term 
‘vitalism’ to describe a form of thought and philosophical activity that he advocates.  
We have already seen that Canguilhem’s commitment to vitalism, as I have 
characterized it, also rests on a rejection of the unique or exceptional character of living 
beings. Despite this terminological difference, there is a profound affinity between 
Canguilhem’s rendering of vitalism and Atlan’s advocacy of ‘philosophy in the shape of 
wisdom’.  
 
Such a philosophy, Atlan argues, is the appropriate complement or partner to science for 
the purpose of analyzing ‘complex and singular’ situations and phenomena. Now let us 
recall that, in the context of the second frame of reference discussed earlier in this 
paper, ‘complex and singular’ phenomena are exactly what living beings are understood 
to be. A philosophy in the shape of wisdom is called for by the fact that ‘the more 
complex and singular a phenomenon is, the more underdetermined any [scientific] 
theory giving some account of this phenomenon will be’ (2011 [1991]: 384). What this 
means is that, due to its singularity, much of the phenomenon will remain unobservable 
under conditions of experimental reproducibility; and for this reason, multiple theories, 
each with a relative and probabilistic truth value, will be able to give some account of 
the phenomenon that has some explanatory power. It is worth citing Atlan in full on the 
implications of this point:  
 
… if a norm must be erected … on the basis of a theory … then each theory will 
permit us to erect very different norms. … without sacrificing any rigour in 
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predicting observable facts, we can choose among different theories the one (or 
the ones) favoring the norm that suits us (for reasons very different from those 
internal to theorizing itself). This choice of theory will be an exercise in controlled 
wishful thinking. This is, apparently, how the choice of theory works – without its 
being conscious, of course – in the development of ethical and political norms that 
proclaim themselves true because they are erected on scientific theories. This 
activity, though dangerous because it is at the origin of modern ideologies, is not 
pointless if it manages to recognize itself for what it is, that is, a construction of a 
rational world, coherent with a certain explicit or implicit project, a project that 
expresses itself in the norm. It must be understood, however, that this norm does 
not come from our rational knowledge of reality, nor is it grounded in or founded 
by this reality. This knowledge does not necessarily emanate from transcendence, 
so to speak, but from concatenations of the imaginary and desires. (2011 [1991]: 
385) 
 
It is thus that, in the words of a scientist committed, qua scientist, to a theoretical 
assumption of absolute determinism (on this see Atlan 2011 [2002]), we find the 
expression of an ethos not dissimilar from Canguilhem’s vitalism. Both address the 
importance of acknowledging the value and the limitations of scientific abstractions; 
both invite us to pay attention to what I have called a ‘relevant beyond’, consisting (in 
Atlan’s vocabulary) of all the determinations that remain unknown to us. The title of the 
chapter in which Atlan’s reflections appear, Knowledge of Ignorance, is almost a literal 
rendition of Bergson’s famous dictum, here congruent with Canguilhem’s position, that 
‘the “vital principle” might indeed not explain much, but it is at least a sort of label 
affixed to our ignorance, so as to remind us of this occasionally, while mechanism 
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invites us to ignore that ignorance’ (Bergson, 1911: 42).  
 
The value of associating Canguilhem’s vitalist ethos with Atlan’s reflections lies in 
demonstrating that there is indeed something more to vitalism than a simple ‘refusal to 
grant mechanism the time it needs to complete its project’ (Canguilhem 2008: 69). 
Atlan stands here for a mechanism whose project has indeed been ‘completed’ – or is at 
least well on its way to being completed – as far the problem of theoretically explaining 
living phenomena is concerned. And yet from this vantage point, as his discussion of 
the underdetermination of theories makes clear, we can see that a mature mechanism 
yields inherently ‘incomplete’ (or underdetermined) representations; and that such 
representations still call for markers of their incompleteness. A mature mechanism, for 
Atlan, requires that we distinguish the domain of the sciences from what he 
characterizes as ‘another knowledge, one condemned to confront the irreducible 
underdetermination of theories’, namely ‘philosophy in the shape of wisdom’ (2011 
[1991]: 384). Atlan advocates such a philosophy to avoid surrendering the analysis of 
singular and complex situations either to forms of irrationalism (‘ideology’) or to forms 
of scientism (‘rationalizing ideology’), whilst affirming the creative, ‘constructivist’ 
dimension involved in engaging with scientific theories for the purpose of erecting 
norms. As a form of ‘controlled wishful thinking’ that ‘recognize[s] itself for what it is’, 
philosophy in the shape of wisdom takes the ensemble of scientific knowledge as its 
starting point but radically differentiates itself from it in two ways: on the one hand, by 
rejecting the reference to science as a source of legitimation for normative visions of the 
order of nature as a whole; and correlatively, by acknowledging the importance of our 
imaginaries and our desires as ingredients in the becoming of nature itself. Imaginaries 
and desires become ‘determinations’ as they feed into the construction of the world 
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through the choice of particular theories – and the norms they imply – among a 
multiplicity of possible ones. When Atlan writes that ‘[i]n our knowledge of our 
ignorance lies our experience of our will’, he therefore invites us simultaneously to 
rejoice in the relative freedom and creative potential of that experience of choice, and to 
take responsibility for what our choices add to the world (2011 [1991]: 389). 
 
Philosophy in the shape of wisdom can thus be imagined as a form of knowledge 
(‘another knowledge’) whose task is to mediate between the domain of scientific 
knowledge and the experience of life. Its role is 
 
to speak of what cannot be formalized, to use natural language with its metaphors, 
analogies, and all the vagueness that comes with them, yet without giving up on 
rationality … on distinguishing good analogies from bad ones, enriching 
metaphors from misleading ones, the vagueness [le vague en moins] that conceals 
what should be said from the vagueness [du vague en plus] that stands for the 
potential of creation. (Atlan, 2011 [1991]: 386) 
 
If there is a practical prescription to be drawn from Atlan’s formulation, therefore, this 
might concern the need for a new pedagogy, designed to cultivate the sensibilities and 
skills required for this role. In contrast to the current situation, where the balance of 
investments (in every sense of the term) is perilously skewed towards the natural 
sciences, it would mean reclaiming the importance of forms of knowledge that engage 
with ‘natural language’ in its multiplicity and diversity, while cultivating forms of 
intellectual rigour that differ from scientific or mathematical formalization. What Atlan 
advocates as ‘philosophy in the shape of wisdom’ in this sense is not dissimilar from 
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developments associated with the ‘narrative turn’ in bioethics and with the field of 
‘medical humanities’ (Charon, 2001; Greco, 2013). 
 
Engaging with the problematic of vitalism in the spirit of Canguilhem points to a more 
general conclusion, suggesting that a mature mechanism demands something more and 
other than the development of a new kind of knowledge to supplement or complement 
the status quo.  What it demands is the cultivation of a collective ethos – in the 
etymological sense of custom, character, disposition – a way of being in the world and 
a way of life.  A vitalist ethos differs specifically from the form of wishful thinking 
associated with the project of modernity, fuelled by imaginaries of a passive, indifferent 
nature and by desires of ultimate control.  It points instead to a mode of life that is 
relatively comfortable with indetermination as a fact of existence, and not predicated on 
its implicit denial. Vitalism as ethos posits nature as a whole in the register of pathos, 
assuming sensitivity as the ontological norm rather than the exception. It admits death – 
disease, pain, disintegration – into its imaginary of what is irreducibly real, as the ebb 
and flow of becoming, instead of treating it as a clandestine occurrence with no right of 
existence in our experience, forever surprising us.  What follows from this attitude is the 
cultivation of an art of life that is simultaneously cautious and adventurous, in ways that 
differ profoundly from the ethos implicit in the scientific materialism of modernity. 
More cautious, in terms of the insistence on the need to be attentive, to take care of the 
multiple and diverse forms of ontological sensitivity, including sensitivity to our 
imaginaries and our desires. And more adventurous, in terms of not being equally 
driven by a fear and denial of death, of pathos, but rather by the confidence that every 
occurrence can expand and add value to experience, and should be honoured and 
respected as such. Here, in this confidence, unsupported by the false reassurances of 
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scientism, and yet alien to the temptations of nihilism – here lies the relevance of 
vitalism now. 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
Notes 
 
1 This characterisation – drawn from the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and featuring at the start 
of the Wikipedia entry on vitalism (accessed on 5/2/2018) – elides a number of significant differences 
among vitalists in the history of biology and medicine (see Benton, 1974 for a useful typology). We will 
return below to the significance of differences among eighteenth-century vitalists.  
2 It is not my purpose in this paper to offer an exegetical reading Canguilhem or Deleuze, whether to 
assess the extent of each author’s ultimate commitment to ‘vitalism’ or the relationship between their 
respective philosophies. In terms of the latter, let it suffice here to note that Deleuze – unlike many of his 
anglophone readers – was intimately familiar with Canguilhem’s work and directly inspired by it. 
Canguilhem had been Deleuze’s dissertation supervisor (with Jean Hyppolite) at the Sorbonne; he later 
solicited the publication of a collection of Deleuze’s essays (Instincts et Institutions, 1953) in the series he 
edited for Hachette; and multiple of Deleuze’s later books include references to the work of his former 
teacher.  Keith Ansell Pearson (1999: 8) credits Canguilhem’s influence with mediating Deleuze’s 
reception of Weissman’s neo-Darwinism, and thereby indirectly all of Deleuze’s biophilosophy.   
3 e.g. Rose (1998: 164-5); Lecourt (1998: 223), and cf Greco (2005). See Gordon (1998) for a detailed 
discussion of the early reception of Canguilhem outside France and particularly in Britain. 
4 See also Gordon (1980 and 1998); Rabinow (1996); and Greco (1998, 2004, 2005).  Historical 
‘problematology’ in the sense proposed by Osborne (2003:1) as ‘a good collective description of the 
endeavours of thinkers such as Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault’ must be not be confused with 
the problématologie proposed by Belgian philosopher Michel Meyer (1986) as a new paradigm for the 
humanities; as Osborne aptly puts it: ‘those who work with problems [in the spirit of Foucault or 
Canguilhem] are not legislators or theorists’ (2003: 10).	
5 For recent writing on Canguilhem see for example several of the essays in the collection edited by De 
Beistegui, Bianco and Gracieuse (2015); Sholl (2016); Bianco (2013). 
6 References on ‘new materialism’ are too numerous to cite, but for key works see Barad (2007) Bennett 
(2010), Braidotti (2011). Similarly for process-theoretical and non-representational approaches in social 
science see Whatmore (2002); Massumi (2002); Fraser, Kember and Lury (2005); Thrift (2008); Brown 
and Stenner (2009); Anderson and Harrison (2010); Stenner (2017). 
7 For historical studies that flesh out this proposition see, e.g., Duchesneau (1982), Duchesneau and 
Cimino (1997), Rey (2000), Williams (2003), and the collection of papers in the special issue edited by 
Wolfe (2008).  
8 Wolfe and Terada (2008) and Kaitaro (2008) stress the continuities between the vitalism of Diderot and 
that of the montpelliérains. By contrast Elizabeth Williams, in her landmark book-length study of 
Montpellier vitalism (2003), stresses key differences between them. In particular she underlines how the 
Encyclopaedists ‘envisioned a unified science of nature encompassing cosmos, earth, and humanity’ 
(2003: 147) whereas the Montpellier vitalists, while searching for an empirically verifiable ‘vital 
principle’  (and differing, in this sense, from animists), insisted on the distinction between the living and 
the non-living (with the vital principle applying only to the former), and particularly on the singularity of 
the human.  
9 See also Bechtel (2013). 
10 It is to describe exactly this kind of processual relation between being and its negation in becoming 
that Viktor von Weizsäcker, Whitehead’s contemporary, used the terms pathic (in contrast to ontic) 
and antilogical (see Weizsäcker 1987 [1946], and Greco 2009 for a fuller discussion). There is also a 
close affinity between Whitehead’s concept of ‘life’ and Canguilhem’s account of health as organic 
‘normativity’. Health as greater normativity would correspond, in Whitehead’s terms, to greater 
degree of ‘aliveness’. 
11 See Stenner (2008), (2016), and (2017) for a critique of this ‘flattening’ gesture in these fields. 	
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12 I use here Arthur Goldhammer’s translation in preference to the more recent one by Geroulanos and 
Ginzburg, where the French original is rendered as ‘an exigency rather than a method and a morality 
rather than a theory’ (2008: 63).  
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